### 1AC Hospitality

#### CONTENTION ONE-Blockade

#### Status quo reforms leave the bulk of the embargo in place-Obama will continue to use it as leverage to pressure Cuba.

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The moves, in part reflecting Obama's campaign promises on Cuba policy, leave in place nearly all of the U.S. economic embargo but do represent the first major moves in a decade or more to alter a policy that is widely criticized as having failed to encourage democracy or human rights in the nearby Communist nation despite nearly half a century of trying. During the campaign, Obama said he would retain the embargo for now as leverage to promote democratic progress in Cuba. If recent interviews with officials in Havana are a guide, the Cuban government will welcome the removal of restrictions on Cuban-Americans. However, it may well bristle at the administration's emphasis on "creating space" for Cubans to operate apart from their government. Cuban officials say they will accept no preconditions in terms of political steps there in order to launch and sustain a direct dialogue between Havana and Washington that could lead to a normalization of relations. How they will react to U.S. telecommunications firms possibly becoming active on the island is also unclear. "The president has made clear he's willing to talk with our adversaries," Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary, said. But, he added, Washington would "not talk for talk's sake." Gibbs also suggested that the next step "in many ways depends on the actions of the Cuban government." In particular, he called for the Cuban government to reduce the fees it charges Cubans for receiving money from American relatives. The administration's announcement came four days before Obama begins participating in this year's Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago. Latin American leaders there are expected to urge him to remove the economic embargo and end the decades of mutual antipathy between the United States and Cuba. To facilitate the flow of information into Cuba, where media are state-controlled, Obama wants to allow U.S. companies to provide fiber-optic and satellite communication links between the United States and Cuba, as well as to receive licenses for cellular phone links and satellite TV and radio services into Cuba. Julia Sweig, a Cuba expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that, if successful, the new telecommunications approach "could help bring communication on [Cuba] and between the two countries into the 21st century. This opens the door for real negotiations, and that will require political will in Havana and Washington." Overall, the administration's steps may be significant in humanitarian terms but do not fundamentally reshape U.S. policy toward Cuba. Non-Cuban Americans still will not be able to travel legally to the island, with some exceptions. The embargo continues.

#### SCENARIO ONE – Disposability

#### The sanctions imposed on Cuba are a modern version of siege warfare – they purposefully deprive civilians of basic necessities putting the most vulnerable at risk

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In many regards, sanctions are the modern version of siege warfare: each involves the systematic deprivation of a whole city or nation of economic resources. Although in siege warfare this is accomplished by surrounding the city with an army, the same effect can be achieved by using international institutions and international pressure to prevent the sale or purchase of goods, as well as to stop migration. It is sometimes argued that an embargoed nation can still engage in marginal trade, despite sanctions; but in a siege as well there may be marginal ways of getting goods through gaps in the blockade. In both cases, however, the unit under embargo or siege is a mixed population rather than a military installation, or is entirely civilian. In both cases, the net effect is the same: the disrup- tion or strangulation of the economy as a whole. As Michael Walzer notes, siege is the oldest form of total war; in siege, noncombatants are not only exposed, but in fact are more likely to be killed than combatants, given that the goal of siege “is surrender, not by defeat of the enemy army, but by the fearful spectacle of the civilian dead. ” 3 The principle of discrim- ination in just war doctrine requires the attacker to distinguish between combat- ants and noncombatants; between combatants who are injured and those who are uninjured; between combatants who are armed and those who have surrendered and are defenseless; and so forth.4 There has never been a strict prohibition against killing civilians, or killing injured or unarmed combatants, when it is required by “military necessity” or as an unavoidable consequence of an attack on a legitimate military target. A common example is that an ammunition facto- ry is a legitimate military target in wartime; if during the bombing of the factory civilians who live nearby are also killed, no war crime has been committed. What is prohibited is to target civilians, or injured or defenseless combatants, directly, or to bomb indiscriminately where the deaths of civilians are foreseeable. Siege warfare reverses these priorities: civilian suffering is not “collateral” damage, but rather is the primary objective of the siege strategy, or at least the foreseeable and direct result of siege. Siege operates by restricting the economy of the entire community, creating shortages of food, water, and fuel. Those who are least able to survive the ensuing hunger, illness, and cold are the very young, the elderly, and those who are sick or injured. Thus the direct consequence of siege is that harm is done to those who are least able to defend themselves, who present the least military threat, who have the least input into policy or military decisions, and who are the most vulnerable. dThe harm done by the enemy’s deprivation is exacerbated by domestic policy, which typically shifts whatever resources there are to the military and to the political leadership. This is sometimes done for security reasons, in the belief that defending against military attack is the highest priority, more immedi- ately urgent than the slower damage of hunger and illness to which the civilian population is subjected. It may also happen because the leadership is corrupt, or because the desperation creates conditions for black marketeering. Both of these consequences —the suffering of the innocent and helpless, and the shifting of resources to the military and the privileged—are as old as siege itself. Thus, the argument can be made that siege is a form of warfare that itself constitutes a war crime. In just war doctrine we could demand a justification for a military strategy in terms of the obligation to minimize harm to civilians: the ammunition factory was a legitimate target, and there was no way to bomb it without collateral damage to nearby residential areas. But siege is peculiar in that it resists such an analysis: the immediate goal is precisely to cause suffering to civilians. In the case of the ammunitions factory, we can answer the question, how is this act consistent with the moral requirement to discriminate? In the case of siege, we cannot. Sanctions are subject to many of the same moral objections as siege. They intentionally, or at least predictably, harm the most vulnerable and the least political, and this is something the party imposing sanctions either knows or should know. To the extent that economic sanctions seek to undermine the economy of a society and thereby prevent the production or importation of necessities, they are functioning as the modern equivalent of siege. To the extent that sanctions deprive the most vulnerable and least political sectors of society of the food, potable water, medical care, and fuel necessary for survival and basic human needs, sanctions should be subject to the same moral objections as siege warfare.

#### This strategy of targeting the most vulnerable can be seen in Cuba where sanctions deny food and medicine to those that need it most

Hidalgo and Martinez 2k (Vilma, professor of macroeconomics at the University of Havana, Milagros, Research Fellow at the University of Havana, working with the Centro de Estudios sobre Estados Unidos (CESEU), “Is the U.S. Economic Embargo on Cuba Morally Defensible?,” muse.jhu.edu/journals/logos/v003/3.4hidalgo.html, Project Muse)

Assuring Adequate Food Supplies and Good Health¶ In spite of the severity of the crisis, one of the goals of the economic program begun in Cuba during the nineties was to preserve social [End Page 106] gains and prevent the costs of this adjustment from impacting spending to benefit the society. Cutbacks required by the inevitable macroeconomic readjustment largely involved administrative costs and subsidies to public enterprise, while the national budgets for health and education remained virtually unchanged. An effort was made to ensure consumption of essential goods by all families through distribution of a quota of these items at subsidized prices. But in spite of good political intentions, the gravity of the monetary pressures that the nation faced led inevitably to lost ground with respect to assuring an adequate diet and maintaining the quality of basic services.¶ Cuban agriculture was not exempt from the crisis. In the face of shortages of fuel and farming supplies, the level of activity in this sector fell significantly, heightening the dependence on imported foods acquired at unfavorable market conditions. As a result, in a few years the effects on consumption by the general population were in evidence: daily caloric consumption, for example, dropped 34 percent, and protein intake plummeted 40 percent between 1989 and the worst year of the crisis, 1993. Despite a slight recent improvement, there is a long row to hoe before previous levels are reached: in 1989 the availability of food per capita was 3,108 caloric units and 73 grams of protein, while in 1997 these figures were 2,480 and 51.7, respectively. 5 This drastic change in consumption levels affected the health of the population, as both men and women experienced weight loss, epidemics of some diseases previously unknown in the country broke out, and the birth weight of babies declined. In these difficult times, every additional dollar paid to import foodstuffs affected Cuban families, taking its toll in human terms.¶ When the Torricelli Act took effect, contracts valued at over $100 million with Argentine subsidiaries of Continental Grain, in New York, and Cargill, in Minnesota, for products such as wheat, soy, beans, peas and lentils had to be canceled. The U.S. market is obviously one of the most competitive in terms of production of [End Page 107] various types of foods. According to several studies, the average cost of importing grains coming from U.S. suppliers, including transportation charges, is $130 (US) per metric ton, substantially cheaper than importing the grain from Europe, which would cost around $270. 6 This means, for example, that in 1997 the added cost for Cuba of importing beans was $24 million (US) dollars, and for importing wheat flour it is $7.8 million each year.¶ Likewise, restrictions imposed on shipping by sea raised transportation costs of food by 30 percent with respect to international rates and lengthened delivery cycles of goods to the people. Thus, for example, a New Zealand company that manufactures powdered milk declined to supply 1,500 metric tons in the face of refusal on the part of their shipping company to deliver the cargo to Cuban ports. Overall, it is estimated that in 1998, the added cost of importing essential foods, given the lack of access to U.S. markets, reached $30 million, 7 which represented approximately 2 percent of exports that year and substantially reduced the global import budget. This figure is equivalent to 15,000 tons of powdered milk that Cuban children never received.¶ The impact on availability of food was not limited exclusively to direct importation of foodstuffs but also exerted considerable effect on the already weakened agro-industrial sector. The productivity of the agricultural and farming sector was severely hampered by the prohibition on selling items such as pesticides, fertilizers, animal feed, and fuel.¶ Two well-known cases were those of Bayer AG of Germany and Sanachem of South Africa. Bayer canceled sales of the pesticide Sencor because the company transferred production of the active ingredient to a plant in Kansas City. Bayer requested permission from the United States to continue exporting to Cuba, but permission was denied. In 1997, Dow Chemical bought the shares of the Sentrachem group of South Africa, owner of Sanachem, with which Cuba had enjoyed stable trading relations since 1992. In 1997 a Cuban import [End Page 108] firm had purchased pesticides valued at $82 million from Sanachem, yet after that acquisition the U.S. Treasury Department put an end to business dealings between the two companies, refusing even to grant a license to cover the shipment of products that were in transit. 8¶ The human costs due to impact on the health sector are even more obvious and dramatic if we consider that U.S. companies produce more than 50 percent of important new drugs on the international market and that 90 percent of patents on new biotechnology products are granted to U.S. firms. Many of these products are vital to saving human lives and have no equivalents made in Cuba. After Torricelli, fourteen subsidiaries based in Germany, Sweden, Japan, France, Argentina, Italy, Australia, the Netherlands, Canada, Belgium and Switzerland that produce medicines and medical equipment stopped selling to Cuba.¶ Cuba is forbidden to buy, from U.S. companies or subsidiaries, products such as third-generation antibiotics, medicines and drugs used in postoperative pediatric cardiology and to treat infantile leukemia, modern cancer therapies, and medications for the relief of side effects, for the treatment of AIDS, and others. Cuba is also denied the ability to purchase equipment and replacement parts for donated equipment, as is the case of Kobe dialysis equipment, used with persons requiring transplants.¶ In addition, the situation was complicated after mergers and acquisitions among American and foreign companies in 1994 and 1995. In 1995, for example, the U.S. company Upjohn merged with the Swedish firm Pharmacia, which since 1970 had been selling medical equipment, reagents, chemotherapy drugs, and other products to a Cuban company. Cuba also lost an important supplier of diagnostic materials when Wisconsin's Sybron International acquired Germany's Nuc. Sales of pacemakers for heart patients were suddenly halted when Siemens of Sweden and Teletronics Pacing System of Australia transferred production and ownership to the United [End Page 109] States. As a result, the number of surgeries at Havana's Cardiology Center, where more than half of Cuba's pacemakers are implanted, dropped 50 percent between 1990 and 1995. The effect of this decline was considerable, since heart disease is the leading cause of death in Cuba. 9

#### This strategy reduces human life to a means to an end-It uses civilian suffering as leverage to enforce a political agenda and should be rejected

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But deontological arguments do offer guidance in situations where military aggression is not at issue, and where the choice therefore is not which innocent population suffers harm, but whether an innocent population may be harmed in the service of the political interests of a foreign state, or for the interest of the international community in enforcing norms. Where sanctions impose suffering on innocent sectors of the target country population for an objective other than preventing the deaths of other innocent persons, this is clearly incompatible with deontological ethics, since in these situations, to use Kantian language, human beings are reduced to nothing more than a means to an end, where that end is something less than the lives of other human beings.

#### SCENARIO TWO – Universalism

#### Sanctions against Cuba leverage international pressure to divide the world into legitimate and illegitimate

Jonathan Harris, 7-29-2002, writer for the Chronicle, B.A. @ Trinity University, 2002, “U.S. should lift embargo, respect Cuban autonomy,” http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2002/07/30/us-should-lift-embargo-respect-cuban-autonomy

Some recent letters have appeared in The Chronicle that criticize the Editorial Board's support for ending the U.S. embargo against Cuba. These letters reflect how many in the United States do not understand our own government's policies toward Cuba, nor do they understand what contemporary life is like on the island. In the June 27 issue, J. Edgar Williams wrote, "The U.S. embargo... has not affected Cuba's ability to trade with the rest of the world." To the contrary, the "Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act," the 1996 legislation that details the specific provisions of the U.S. embargo, penalizes all nations that trade with Cuba by disallowing ships

to port in the United States for six months after they have visited any Cuban port. Additionally, the act allows the United States to enact economic sanctions against countries that trade with Cuba. Both of these policies starve the small island nation of billions of dollars in potential revenue. As we speak, President George W. Bush pressures Mexican President Vicente Fox and other Latin American leaders to cut economic ties with Cuba in exchange for closer trade relations with the United States. I am disturbed by the dichotomist options that the current debate has left us with, forcing us to decide whether the United States should: a) maintain the embargo or b) lift the embargo and allow Cubans to experience the "wonders" of free market capitalism. Cuba needs neither. Contrary to the dictates of our country's power-brokers, capitalism does not work for everyone. Cubans in Cuba have chosen a socialist economy, and they should not be punished or patronized for that decision. Indeed, it is a tough lesson to learn that we in the United States do not know what is right for all the world's inhabitants. I am not an apologist for the Cuban revolutionary government. I simply ask that we learn more about how things really work before judging a people and their right to self-determination. We can begin this process by respecting Cuba as an autonomous nation and lifting the unjust embargo. What do you think?

#### The attempt at Westernized unification causes more harm than good – we should stop trying to unify the world through a single political system and embrace the idea of a radical plurality

Paul Corey-Voeglin Institute- 9-[2-5]-2004, Humber College, McMaster University, member of the Eric Voegelin Institute, a humanities and social sciences research institute devoted to the revitalization of teaching and understanding of the “great books” of Western civilization in comparison with other tradition, “Totality and Ambivalence: Postmodern Responses to Globalization and the American Empire,” http://www.lsu.edu/artsci/groups/voegelin/society/2004%20Papers/Corey2004.shtml

The third, and final, autoimmune moment is what Derrida calls "The vicious cycle of repression." Derrida claims that humanity is not defenseless against the threat of this new evil, but he claims that "all forms" of the current "war on terror" will only work to "regenerate, in the short and long term, the causes of the evil they seek to eradicate" (PT 100). In other words, the victims of Western military action in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, will respond, either personally or by proxy, with more terrorism. This in turn will inspire more violence from America and its allies, and so on ad infinitum. Derrida's brief account of this autoimmune moment was formulated a month after 9/11 and long before the Iraq war. From a Derridian perspective, the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq was a suicidal autoimmune response to terror, not just because it was fought under false pretenses (no WMD's, no working relation between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda), but also because it ironically facilitated and inspired the spread of terror (in Iraq itself and Spain). The chaos of post-war Iraq created an environment in which Islamic extremism could thrive. Islamist movements that were oppressed by Saddam's tyranny were revitalized. The U.S. invasion also divided the West. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Western world was united, and there was little opposition to the war in Afghanistan. Within a year and a half, that unity had disintegrated. The schisms created by the war in Iraq are now everywhere. Consequently, the international response required to contain terrorism has been compromised. Our immune systems are threatened. Baudrillard and the Traditional Moral Order Baudrillard's and Derrida's analyses of globalization and its discontents are similar. But their accounts of how we should respond to this malaise, and what the future may hold, differ radically. Baudrillard writes that "Terrorism is immoral," but that terror "is a response to a globalization which is itself immoral." Then, in a manner that recalls Nietzsche, he writes: "let us be immoral: and if we want to have some understanding of all this, let us go and take a little look beyond Good and Evil" (ST 12-13). Baudrillard attacks the predominant Western understanding of Good and Evil. He defines the Western conception of "Good" as "the unification of things in a totalized world," whereas Evil is whatever antagonizes or disrupts this unification. [11] It must be said that all of Baudrillard's philosophical efforts are directed against such a unification; thus, in this sense, he is firmly on the side of "Evil." However, we must not think that this leads to a philosophy where "everything is permitted." Baudrillard is "immoral" from the standpoint of a Western philosophy, which can only conceive of goodness as total unification; however, Baudrillard wants to get beyond this understanding, and he directs us to, what he calls, the traditional "moral universe" that existed in premodern societies. Once again, Baudrillard works in the spirit of Nietzsche, who wanted to move beyond Christian and modern conceptions of "good and evil," but not beyond older conceptions of "good and bad." [12] The expectation, central to both Judeo-Christian and modern understandings, that Good can be separated from Evil, or that it can eradicate Evil, is a disorienting illusion – an illusion that Baudrillard calls a "terroristic dream." He writes: "We ought not to entertain the illusion that we might separate the two, that we might cultivate good and happiness in a pure state and expel evil and sorrow as wastes." [13] But this eschatological illusion, according to Baudrillard, has been propagated in Western thought, first in "theology," and then in the "whole of modern philosophy." [14] Baudrillard writes: This is precisely where the crucial point lies – in the total misunderstanding on the part of Western philosophy, on the part of the Enlightenment, of the relation between Good and Evil. We believe naively that the progress of Good, its advance in all fields (the sciences, technology, democracy, human rights), corresponds to a defeat of Evil. No one seems to have understood that Good and Evil advance together, as part of the same movement. (ST 13) Thus, "it is not by expurgating evil that we liberate good. Worse, by liberating good, we also liberate evil." [15] Globalization unleashed a "total extrapolation of Good" (ST 14), but evil was not diminished; on the contrary, it has increased exponentially, "transpiring though" the hegemony of Globalization (the Good) and manifesting itself in system breakdowns, accidents, catastrophes, new diseases, violence, and terrorism. Evil, writes Baudrillard, is "everywhere," despite our enlightened efforts to conquer it; it has "metamorphosed into all the viral and terroristic forms that obsess us." [16] Baudrillard directs us away from the dream that evil can be conquered. He claims we will not achieve "equilibrium" until we accept what he variously calls the "moral universe" or "traditional universe" (ST 14). It is a universe that accepts the world as it is without any appeal to an actual or hypothetical triumph of the Good. This world, according to Baudrillard, is constituted by an inescapable duality. "Everything," says Baudrillard, "is in the play of duality." [17] And perhaps the most fundamental duality is that of Good and Evil. The world as constituted by Good and Evil cannot be exchanged for a world constituted by Good alone. Thus, the traditional moral universe was an "antagonistic coexistence of two equal and eternal principles, Good and Evil, at once inseparable and irreconcilable." [18] There was "a balance between Good and Evil, in accordance with a dialectical relation which maintained the tension and equilibrium of the moral universe, come what may" (ST 14). This delicate balance was maintained because there was no supremacy of one over the other. However, this balance was upset with the Western hegemony of the Good – the effort to destroy any negative or adverse force, and subsume all "otherness" within a universal order. The irony, of course, is that Evil developed exponentially; the positive accomplishments of Western economic expansion and technological advancement have been met by equally negative reactions. Thus, Baudrillard argues against any type of Western based "internationalism," whether this be the internationalism of economic globalization or universal human rights. The idea that Western values or markets can unify the world, or mediate the world's differences, must be abandoned, for the intent is naively utopian and the results have been destructive. Through these efforts, the West has attempted to exterminate all "otherness." It will accept "difference," says Baudrillard, but only if the various differences accept the overriding Western value system. We must, according to Baudrillard, adopt a different strategy. We must surrender to the fragmentation that is occurring, and embrace the idea of a radically plural world that cannot be mediated or unified by a transcendent system of law, politics, economics or values. Baudrillard calls for nothing short of abandoning the Western dream of unification and universality in all its guises.

#### Preserving an ideological conformity causes violence and makes a spiral to nuclear apocalypse inevitable

Darrell J. Fasching-prof religious studies, University of South Florida-93, Professor of Religious Studies of the University of South Florida in Tampa, holds a joint appointment in Special Education, has served as Associate Dean for Faculty Development in the College of Arts and Sciences and as Chair of the Department of Religious Studies, “The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia?” p. 1-7

Now the whole earth had one language and the same words. And as they migrated from the east, they came upon a plain in the land of Shinar and settled there. And they said to one another, "Come, let us make bricks, and burn them thoroughly." And they had brick for stone, and bitumen for mortar. Then they said, "Come, let us build ourselves a city, and a tower with its top in the heavens, and let us make a name for ourselves; otherwise we shall be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth." The Lord came down to see the city and the tower which mortals had built. And the Lord said, ''Look, they are one people, and they have all one language; and this is only the beginning of what they will do; nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible for them. Come, let us go down, and confuse their language there, so that they will not understand one another's speech." So the Lord scattered them abroad from there over the face of all the earth, and they left off building the city. Therefore it was called Babel, because there the Lord confused the language of all the earth; and from there the Lord scattered them abroad over the face of all the earth. Genesis 11:19 1 The story of Babel is a tale for our times. It is a parable through which we might come to understand our situation. The citizens of Babel, it seems, sought to build a perfect city, a utopia whose technological prowess would make their name known throughout the earth. These citizens, we are told, sought to seize control of transcendence through the ideology of a single language and the common technological project of building a tower to heaven. God, however, upset their efforts by confusing their tongues, so that they could not understand each other. They became strangers to one another and so could not complete their task. They had to abandon all "final solutions" and settle for an unfinished city. The popular interpretation of this story is that the confusion of tongues was a curse and a punishment for the Page 2 human sin of pride. But I am convinced that this is a serious misunderstanding of its meaning. For this story must be interpreted within the tradition of stories that make up the canon of the Tanakh (Old Testament), where the command to welcome the stranger appears more often than any other commandment. 2 In the light of that emphasis, I would suggest that the point of the story is that human beings misunderstood where transcendence lay, and God simply redirected them to the true experience of transcendence, which can occur only when there are strangers to be welcomed into our lives. The moral of this story, as I read it, is that utopian transcendence is to be found not in a "finished world" of technological and ideological conformity but in an "unfinished world" of diversity, a world that offers us the opportunity to welcome the stranger. Indeed, our attempts to define a world through technological prowess and ideological uniformity have led us, more than once, to the brink of MAD-ness (mutually assured destruction) the brink of an apocalyptic nuclear annihilation. Our hope lies in seeing the utopian possibilities of a world of diversity the latent possibilities that can be actualized through an ethic of welcoming the stranger. This book follows upon and expands the argument of my previous book, Narrative Theology After Auschwitz: From Alienation to Ethics (Fortress, 1992). It is intended to be an experiment in theology of culture as an approach to comparative religious ethics through narrative. In Narrative Theology After Auschwitz I attempted to restructure the Christian narrative tradition in the light of Auschwitz through a dialogue with that strand of post- Holocaust Jewish theology and ethics that draws on the Jewish narrative tradition of chutzpah.3 That volume culminated in an ethic of personal and professional responsibility proposed as a strategy for restraining the human capacity for the demonic. This volume, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia? continues the narrative ethics approach but extends the ethical focus of the discussion to encompass religion, technology, and public policy in a cross-cultural perspective. In this work, I attempt to do what narrative ethicists have said cannot be done; namely, construct a cross-cultural ethic of human dignity, human rights, and human liberation that is rooted in and respects the diversity of narrative traditions. Moreover, I have tried to do this without succumbing to either ethical relativism or ethical absolutism, even as I seek to directly confront the dominant narrative of our technological civilization. That narrative, I am convinced, is the Janus-faced myth of "Apocalypse or Utopia." This mythic narrative tends to render us Page 3 ethically impotent, for, mesmerized by the power of technology, we become trapped in the manic-depressive rhythms of a sacral awe; that is, of fascination and dread. When we are caught up in the utopian euphoria created by the marvelous promises of technology we do not wish to change anything. And when, in our darker moments, we fear that this same technology is out of control and leading us to our own apocalyptic self-destruction, we feel overwhelmed and unable to do anything. The paradox is that the very strength of our literal utopian euphoria sends us careening toward some literal apocalyptic "final solution." In Narrative Theology After Auschwitz I argued that the demonic narrative theme that dominated Auschwitz was "killing in order to heal." In this book I argue that this theme became globalized when it was incorporated into the Janus-faced technological mythos that emerged out of Hiroshima. This mythic narrative underlies and structures much of public policy in our nuclear age. In response to this demonic narrative, I propose a cross-cultural coalition for an ethic of human dignity, human rights, and human liberation at the intersection of those holy communities whose narrative traditions emphasize the importance of welcoming the stranger. My goal is to construct a bridge not only over the abyss between religions, East and West, but also between religious and secular ethics. The total project, then, is about religion, ethics, and public policy after Auschwitz and Hiroshima. It is about (a) rethinking the meaning of civilization and public order in an emerging pluralistic world civilization as we approach the end of a millenniumthe year 2000 C.E.; (b) the need for a cross-cultural ethic in a world wracked by ethical relativism and ideological conflict; and (c) sacred and secular public narratives in a technological civilization and the appropriate role for religion in the shaping of public values in a "secular" world. The perspective from which this book is written is that of theology. However, it is not "Christian" theology, although it is most certainly theology written by a Christian. It is not "confessional theology," but theology understood as an academic discipline within the humanities, whose purpose is the illumination of the human experience (individual and communal) of transcendence as self-transcendence. Needless to say, the same subject matter would be treated differently had this project been written by a Buddhist or some other more "secular" a-theist, 4 or by a Hindu, Jew, or Muslim rather than a Christian. And yet I intend it to be a theology that has something to say not only to Christians but also to Jews, Buddhists, and otherseven to ''secular" humanistic a-theists. What I am engaged in is "theology of culture," a discipline first Page 4 introduced by Paul Tillich in his 1920 essay, "On the Idea of a Theology of Culture," with which he inaugurated his career. 5 Theology of culture is an appropriate discipline for the "secular" university in an emerging world civilization. For, as Tillich insists, the theologian of culture is no ''confessional theologian" but rather a "free agent" who takes as his or her task the identification and elucidation of the relationship between religion and culture in all its diversity. Theology of culture could equally be called "philosophy of religion," provided that discipline were able to break free of its nearly exclusive bias as a tradition of commentary on the logic of Western theism rather than on religion as a transcultural human phenomenon. Theology of culture, as I understand it, exists at the intersection of philosophy and the history of religions, as a form of comparative religious ethics. It separates itself from some forms of comparative religious ethics in that it goes beyond description to prescription. Its task is nothing less than a total critique of culture. Doing ethics requires not just philosophical reflection but also historical, sociological, and psychological reflection. Tillich's proposal for a theology of culture draws these diverse elements into a unified whole that replaces traditional ethics with the new and uniquely modern task of the critique of culture. The critique of culture "as a whole" presents a unique problem. For if we live, move, and have our being within culturehow is it possible to transcend it so as to critique it? From what vantage point can we "stand outside it" so to speak? Such a critique presupposes the identification of values that, in some sense, transcend the cultures in which they are embodied. I believe such values can be identified. However, they do not exist in a vacuum. They are embodied in particular types of narrative carried by specific types of communal traditions that, in some sense, stand apart from the cultures in which they find themselves. The ultimate goal of theology of culture is to identify those religious experiences, forms of religious community and narrative traditions that have transcended the historical epoch and cultural milieu of their origin to influence other times and places. For these narrative traditions will have proven themselves culturally transcendent allies and therefore may offer possible norms for the critique of both religions and cultures. Although I attempt to identify the positive and negative value of several types of religious experience in this book, I do not pretend to have written it from some neutral Archimedean vantage point. As Tillich insisted, no theologian of culture can escape his or her own religious and cultural history. Indeed, every scholar in the social sciences and humanities is a "participant observer" in the human condition Page 5 being studied. There is no neutral vantage point from which to begin. As Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas have both argued, no scholar lives in a storyless world, not even the Enlightenment rationalist who pretends to. One must acknowledge one's starting position and work outward from there. This is as true for the psychologist or anthropologist as it is for the political scientist, philosopher, and theologian. If we wish to speak of (or to) other storied worlds we must find a way to stretch our own narrative worlds to make a place for their otherness. That is in fact what I shall attempt to do. My own starting point is that of an alienated Christian, alienated from my own narrative traditions by my encounter with the Holocaust and the history of anti-Judaism that paved the way to it and by the processes of secularization in a technical civilization that led not only to Auschwitz but also Hiroshima. Confessionally, my stand in Christianity, like Tillich's, is that of a Lutheran. But like Tillich, I seek to be an objective scholar, making philosophically fair statements and evaluations about a wide diversity of religious and cultural phenomenon in order to construct a social ethic that can sustain a total critique of modern culture. Nevertheless, I am only too aware how vulnerable are the arguments and methodologies that I use in this book. Many specialists will no doubt have serious questions about my grasp of materials that touch upon their areas. I too have such questions. But I see no point in playing it safe, I mean to provoke discussion, and I hope the dialogue that follows shall enrich and correct my perspective. Moreover, I confess my own perspective and its limitations at the outset because I believe that after Auschwitz and Hiroshima it is dangerous to write in the third person, as if no one in particular were having these thoughts. In our world we each need to take responsibility for our thoughts and their social consequences. I reflect further on these matters in the Epilogue, and some may find it helpful to read that concluding essay immediately after reading this Prologue to understand more clearly what I am attempting to do in the body of the text itself. The best way to describe the "style" of the theology of culture proposed in these books is to suggest that it is a "decentered" or "alienated theology." Alienated theology is the opposite of apologetic theology. Apologetic theology typically seeks to defend the "truth" and ''superiority" of one's own tradition against the "false," "inferior," and "alien" views of other traditions. Alienated theology, by contrast, is theology done "as if" one were a stranger to one's own narrative traditions, seeing and critiquing one's own traditions from Page 6 the vantage point of the other's narrative traditions. It is my conviction that alienated theology is the appropriate mode for theology in an emerging world civilizationa civilization tottering in the balance between apocalypse and utopia. There are two ways to enter world history, according to the contemporary author John Dunne: you can be dragged in by way of world war or you can walk in by way of mutual understanding. By the first path, global civilization emerges as a totalitarian project of dominance that risks escalating into a nuclear apocalypse. By the second path, we prevent the first, creating global civilization through an expansion of our understanding of what it means to be human. This occurs when we pass over to an other's religion and culture and come back with new insight into our own. Gandhi is an example, passing over to the Sermon on the Mount and coming back to the Hindu Bhagavad Gita to gain new insight into it as a scripture of nonviolence. Gandhi never seriously considered becoming a Christian but his Hinduism was radically altered by his encounter with Christianity. One could say the same (reversing the directions) for Martin Luther King Jr., who was deeply influenced by Gandhi's understanding of nonviolent resistance in the Gita. When we pass over (whether through travel, friendship, or disciplined study and imagination) we become "strangers in a strange land" as well as strangers to ourselves, seeing ourselves through the eyes of another. Assuming the perspective of a stranger is an occasion for insight and the sharing of insight. Such crosscultural interactions build bridges of understanding and action between persons and cultures that make cooperation possible and conquest unnecessary. "Passing over" short circuits apocalyptic confrontation and inaugurates utopian new beginningsnew beginnings for the "post-modern'' world of the coming third millennium. Gandhi and King are symbols of a possible style for a postmodern alienated theology. To be an alien is to be a stranger. To be alienated is to be a stranger to oneself. We live in a world of ideological conflict in which far too many individuals (whether theists or a-theists) practice a "centered theology" in which they are too sure of who they are and what they must do. Such a world has far too many answers and not nearly enough questions and selfquestioning. A world divided by its answers is headed for an inevitable apocalyptic destiny. However, when we are willing to become strangers to ourselves (or when we unwillingly become so), new possibilities open up where before everything was closed and hopeless. At the heart of my position is the conviction that the kairos of our time calls forth the badly neglected Page 7 ethic of "welcoming the stranger" that underlies the biblical tradition and analogously "welcoming the outcast" that underlies the Buddhist tradition. This care for the stranger and the outcast, I shall argue, provides the critical norm for identifying authentic transcendence as self-transcendence. Centered theologies, whether sacred or secular, theist or a-theist, are ethnocentric theologies that can tolerate the alien or other, if at all, only as a potential candidate for conversion to sameness. Centered theologies are exercises in narcissism that inevitably lead down apocalyptic paths like those that led to Auschwitz and Hiroshima. Why? Because such theologies, whether sacred or "secular," cannot permit there to be others in the world whose way of being might, by sheer contrast, cause self-doubt and self-questioning. When as a student I read Paul Tillich, I found it hard to believe him when he said that the questions were more important than the answers. I was so taken with his answers that I was sure he was just trying to be modest. What really mattered were the answers. Since then, I have come to realize that answers always seem more important and more certain to those who have come by them without wrestling with the questions. I know now that Tillich was quite serious and quite rightthe questions are indeed more important. I have come to find a fullness in the doubts and questions of my life, which I once thought could be found only in the answers. After Auschwitz and Hiroshima, I distrust all final answersall final solutions. Mercifully, doubts and questions have come to be so fulfilling that I find myself suspicious of answers, not because they are necessarily false or irrelevant, but because even when relevant and true they are, and can be, only partial. It is doubt and questioning that always lures me on to broader horizons and deeper insights through an openness to the infinite that leaves me contentedly discontent. Alienated theology understands doubt and the questions that arise from it as our most fundamental experience of the infinite. For, our unending questions keep us open to the infinite, continually inviting us to transcend our present horizon of understanding. In a like manner, the presence of the stranger continuously calls us into question and invites us to transcend the present horizon of the egocentric and ethnocentric answers that structure our personal and cultural identities. An alienated theology understands that only a faith which requires one to welcome the alien or stranger is truly a utopian faith capable of transforming us into "new beings" who are capable of creating a new world of pluralistic human interdependence.

#### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should lift its economic sanctions on Cuba.

#### Contention Two-Hospitality

#### The status quo is locked in a battle between good and evil. Lifting the Cuban embargo is an act of hospitality, whose pure ethic is openness in the face of uncertainty.

Richard Kearney, 1-01-2001, Charles Seelig professor of philosophy at Boston College, author of over 20 books on European philosophy and literature, “Others and Aliens; Between Good and Evil,” from “Evil After Postmodernism; Histories, Narratives, and Ethics,” https://www2.bc.edu/~kearneyr/pdf\_articles/pl86217.pdf

One of the oldest conundrums of human thought is: unde malum? Where does evil come from? What are the origins of evil — human, natural, super natural? What is the character of evil — sin, suffering, catastrophe, death? Deconstruction cautions against a rush to judgement. While not for a moment denying that evil exists, Derrida and certain other postmodern thinkers counsel vigilance. The tendency of our media society, so prone to hysteria, is to anathematize anything that is unfamiliar as “evil.” The other thus becomes the alien, the stranger the scapegoat, the dissenter the devil. And it is this proclivity to demonize alterity as a threat to our collective identity that so easily issues in paranoid fantasies about invading enemies. Any threat to “national security” is met with immediate defense-attack mechanisms. One thinks of McCarthy’s blacklists and Reagan’s Star Wars, the Soviet show trials and gulags, Mao’s cultural revolution and Tiananmen Square, the embargo of Cuba and the mining of Managua, the bombing of Cambodia and the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, Bloody Sunday and the introduction of internment without trial in Ulster, Kristallnachi and Auschwitz, Satilla and Chabrilla, Sarajevo and Kosovo. The list is interminable. Most nation-states bent on preserving their body politic from alien viruses seek to pathologize and purge their adversaries. Faced with a threatening outsidei; the best mode of defense becomes attack. Again and again the national we is defined over and against the alien them, That’s one reason borders exist, with nationals “in” and aliens “out,” You can, of course, cross the border with the right passport and become an alien resident (like myself). But to be truly uuionalized. you need more — not always readily available if you happen to be arriving from beneath the Rio Grande or beyond the Gaza strip. National security draws a cordon sanitaire around the nation-state, protecting it from alien trespassers. Like the line drawn in sand at the Alamo. Or the Mason—Dixon line, Or other lines separating north and south — in Vietnam, in Korea, in Lebanon, in Ireland. It is in the context of such partitioning and polarizing that Derrida has pursued the question of justice and hospitality in recent years. Every nation- state is logocentric to the extent that it excludes those who do not conform (non-a) to its identity logic (a is a). This is necessary up to a point, as even the cosmopolitan Kant recognized when he accepted the need to issue conditions for refugee visitors to a state (e.g., that their sojourn be temporary, law-abiding, and non-divisive).2 The world belongs to everyone. yes, but within the borders of nation-states, it belongs to some morc than others. Granted, some form of immigration/emigration laws are inevitable, That’s the law and Derrida accepts this; but he goes on to argue that there’s something beyond the law: namely, justice. And justice demands more: unconditional hospitality to the alien. Hospitality is only truly just, this argument goes, when it resists the temptation to discriminate between good or evil others, that is, between the hostile enemy (host is) and the benign host (hospis). Derrida has much to say about such alienology in his book, De’ 1’hospitalité As we generally understand it, the subject of hospitality is a generous host who decides, as master chez lui, whom to invite into his home. But it is precisely because of such sovereign self-possession that the host comes to fear certain others who threaten to invade his house, transforming him from a host into a hostage. The laws of hospitality thus reserve the right of each host to evaluate, select, and choose those he wishes to include or exclude — that is, to discriminate. Such discrimination, indispensable to the “law of hospitality” (hospitalité en droit), requires that each visitor identify and name him/herself before entering ones home. And this identification process involves at least some degree of violence. Derrida comments astutely on this paradox: There can be no sovereignty in the classic sense without the sovereignty of the self in its own home, but since there is no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only operate by filtering, choosing and therefore excluding and doing violence. A certain injustice . . . is present from the outset, at the very threshold of the right to hospitality. This collusion between the violence of power or the force of law (Gewali) on the one hand, and hospitality on the other, seems to be radically integral to the very inscription of hospitality as a right.4 Derrida goes on to link this inclusive/exclusive law of hospitality with ethics in the more general sense. The paradox of the stranger (xenos/hostis) as either invader-alien or welcome-other “extends from the circumscribed field of ethos or ethics, of habitation or visitation as ethos, of Sittlichkeit, of objective morality as specifically identified in Hegel’s threefold determination of right and the philosophy of right: fiirni1y society (civil or bourgeois) and state (or nation-state).”5 Derrida sums up the aporia of the alien-other thus: “the outsider (hostis) received as host or as enemy. Hospitality, hostility, hostipitality.” Fully cognizant of the way this undecidable dialectic con founds our ethical conventions, Derrida affirms the priority of a hospitality of justice — open to the absolute other as another without name. Here we supersede the hospitality of law. What distinguishes the absolute other is that he is without distinction, that is, without name or proper name. And the absolute or unconditional hospitality that he deserves marks a break with everyday conventions of hospitality governed by rights, contracts, duties, and pacts. Absolute hospitality, argues Derrida, requires that I open my home and that I give not only to the stranger (furnished with a family name and the social status of a stranger, etc.) but to the absolute other, unknown and anonymous; and that 1 give place (donne lieu), Let come, arrive, let him take his place in the place that I offer him, without demanding that he give his name or enter into some reciprocal pact.7 If absolute hospitality requires us to break with the accredited hospitality of right, this doesn’t mean repudiating the latter out of hand; it may even mean, concedes Derrida. preserving it in a state of perpetual progress and mutation. What it does mean, however, is that absolute hospitality is as heterogeneous to conditional hospitality as justice is to the law of right with which it is tied.8 But Derrida adds a telling coda to this dazzling deconstruction of the “right of hospitality.” The other is not just the alien stranger, utterly external to home, family, nation, or state. That would he to relegate the other to absolute exteriority — barbarous, savage, precultural, and prejuridical. No, in order that hospitality be just, we must allow some way for the absolute other to enter our home, family, nation, state, And that is why justice can never dispense with the law of right: “The relation to the alien/stranger (l’étranger) is regulated by the law of right (le droit), by the becoming-right of justice.”9 The difficulty with this analysis of hospitality is that it seems to preclude our need to differentiate between good and evil aliens, between benign and malign strangers, between saints and psychopaths (though admittedly 99 per cent of us fall somewhere between the two). If hospitality is to remain absolutely just and true, all incoming others must remain unidentifiable and undecidable. Derrida appears to claim as much when he declares that for pure hospitality or pure gift to occur there must be absolute surprise . . . an opening without horizon of expectation . . . to the newcomer whoever that may be. The newcomer may be good or evil, but if you exclude the possibility that the newcomer is coining to destroy your house, if you want to control this and exclude this terrible possibility in advance, there is no hospitality. . . . The other, Like the Messiah, must arrive whenever he or she wants.1° For Derrida, aliens only come in the dark (like thieves in the night), and we are always in the dark when they come. We are never sure who or what they are; we cannot even be sure if we are hallucinating or not. For the absolute other is without name and without face, an “impossible, unimaginable, unforseeable, unbelievable, absolute surprise.” The best we can do is try to read between the lines and make a leap of faith, an impossible leap of faith, like Abraham, like Kierkegaard. But why not add — and here’s my difficulty with the undecidable — “like Jim Jones or David Koresh” or other figures of mystical madness who believe they are recipients of messianic messages from sorne Other they caJi God?

#### Even if this unconditional hospitality might be impossible to legislate, we must still attempt to make an open society – else we cannot stop the xenophobia that demonizes Latin America.

Brock Bahler, Spring-xx-2010, Duquesne University, Philosophy, Graduate Student, “Derridean Hospitality in an Age of Political Xenophobia,” http://www.academia.edu/2235169/Derridean\_Hospitality\_in\_an\_Age\_of\_Political\_Xenophobia

The Cult(ure)ivation of Fear Consequently, however, we are not a nation of people who know how to practice philoxenia, despite how much we claim to give to non-profit organizations or to foreign aid. Instead, we have opted for a culture of xenophobia instead. Fear drives the installation of security systems, fenced-in homes, and our ever-increasingly private lives. Fear is what sells our newspapers, drives our political policies, and often ultimately influences our vote. Rather than a culture of welcoming the stranger, we have witnessed a cultivation of fear. Insidious in our thinking is a belief that anything foreign is dangerous and ought to be feared. As a result, much of the inflammatory rhetoric in the public square is aimed at spreading distrust and a complete dismissal of the other rather than willingness for open dialogue. Such rhetoric can be clearly seen in the speech revolving around terrorism and American foreign policy with the Middle East, the issue of immigration and undocumented immigrants in the United States, and most recently in the 2008 presidential campaign. A common view pervades our culture, for instance, that all Muslims support terrorism, and that the Middle East is in desperate need of American democracy. Such views have led to the mistreatment of Muslim and Arab-native people in our country, and in the blacklisting and deportation of some of them. It can be observed in the way “being Arab” has become a kind of racial slur in our society. And this xenophobia is evidenced in the up-to-date tally of U.S. military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan while there is virtually no report of the possibly 1.3 million Iraqis who have died since the American occupation in 2003 and millions of others who have fled from their homes.9 Xenophobia can be seen in the way many people have responded to the problem of undocumented workers, particularly in those who are convinced “those Mexicans”—as if every one of them is from Mexico—are going to steal our jobs and force us to all learn Spanish

+, and that the only proper response is to round them up and ship them home. Convinced that to be “all-American” is to be White and English-speaking, there exists a large portion of our population who are wary of the foreign tongues and faces of immigrants. This white supremacist thinking is exhibited in the comments of Pat Buchanan, for instance, who said that the diverse immigration population that is eradicating a white majority in the U.S. will bring about a “Third World America.” Such convictions have not only led to the subhuman treatment of undocumented workers but have also made it more difficult for refugees, individuals seeking asylum, and immigrants to obtain U.S. citizenship. This culture of xenophobia seems no more vivid in our imagination currently than in how it has been portrayed in the finally over 2008 presidential campaign. Numerous Republicans utilized countless fear tactics to try to deter people from voting for our new President, Barack Obama. They chanted his middle name “Hussein” in order to incite distrust and fear into Americans. They fabricated lies that Obama is a Muslim— which, again, would having a Muslim as President really be such a bad thing? In fact, Rush Limbaugh went so far as to say that Obama was not American but was an Arab (codeword for “Muslim,” which is then a codeword for “terrorist”) and came from an Arab part of Africa. His comment not only encourages the breeding of a culture of fear, but it is simply not true—Kenya (even though Obama is not “from” Kenya) is in sub-Saharan Africa, where, ironically enough, the national language is English and 90% of its population identify themselves as Christian. Obama has been said to “pal around with terrorists,” has been called a socialist, a Marxist, and a communist—as if all of these terms were synonymous and were somehow evil in themselves. He has been called unpatriotic and un-American (i.e., not White), and even the anti-Christ. This billowing racist neo-McCarthyism is expounded with the view in mind that Obama, because of his blackness, is somehow not one of us, is mysterious and strange—is the enemy—and we ought to do everything to shore up our defenses against those who may take away what we hold to be “American.” Indeed, one article which noted the many hate crimes which occurred after Obama won the election—from campaign signs vandalized to schoolchildren chanting “Assassinate Obama”—cited how there is “a large subset of white people…who feel that they are losing everything they know, that the country their forefathers built has somehow been stolen from them” because of the results of this election. One man went so far as to say, “If you had real change it would involve all the members of (Obama's) church being deported” (Washington).10 The (Im)Possibility of a Politics of Hospitality What then can be said about the state of our nation and its need for hospitality? Derrida himself made it extremely clear he did not think it possible to legislate unconditional hospitality. Nations, governments, & communities have multiple ethical obligations constantly interfering with and overriding each other. Nations are just as equally obligated to create asylums for the stranger, the orphan, and the widow as they are to protect against the threat of terrorism, for example. In other words, Derrida The American Future: www.American-Future.com writes, “Hospitality is doomed to be conditional and limited—and therefore violent” (Smith 70). But even if unconditional hospitality cannot be legislated—which is undesirable in many ways—it nonetheless is the very thought which allows us to think of the idea of alterity and is, therefore, “the condition of the political” (Borradori 129). In other words, all of our limited kinds of hospitality, no matter how fractured or discriminating they are, can only be conceptualized in light of unconditional hospitality. As Derrida states, “If we want to understand what hospitality means, we have to think of unconditional hospitality, that is, openness to whomever, to any newcomer” (Derrida, Caputo, & Kearney 304).11 Furthermore, unconditional hospitality is like a specter haunting us from the future, reminding us that we have yet to arrive at “real” democracy, that democracy is always “to come.” Unconditional hospitality, then, haunts us as a healthy reminder that, for Derrida, the “(essential) opposition between the unconditional ideal and the conditions of reality, does not issue in either complacency or despair; rather, [it] finds in this disparity a call and a challenge: to make laws more hospitable” (Smith 70). It is an ideal that should permeate our life and political practice in such a way that it breaks forth as justice through the cracks of the law. What then are some ways in which unconditional hospitality can challenge our laws and stretch our current thresholds of hospitality? A formidable response to the complex matter of the proliferate racism in America would require far more than this paper can offer, but it is safe to say that such acts and attitudes should be roundly condemned. And the notion that there exists an essential, unified “American identity” that ought to be preserved—whether that consists of being White, Christian, English speaking, pro-war, or pro-capitalist—ought to be seriously questioned.

#### The plan allows for an ethic of universal, unconditional hospitality– limited hospitality only accepts the other if they comply with our demands, demonizing those who don’t.

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To clarify what he means by absolute hospitality, Derrida distinguishes it from "tolerance." For many in the West, "tolerance" is the ultimate ground of ethics, or the basis of human rights, but Derrida argues that this is not the case. Tolerance is the limited form of hospitality. If we are tolerant, we "accept the foreigner, the other, the foreign body up to a certain point, and so not without restrictions. Tolerance is a conditional, circumspect, careful hospitality" (PT 128). Derrida points out that tolerance is always on the side of the strongest. It is the stronger power that agrees to "tolerate," "put up with," or "suffer" a weaker power that it thinks is inferior or wrong, and which it could oppress, exclude or destroy. Instead, the stronger power decides to let a weaker powers live, and perhaps even thrive, but only under certain conditions (see PT 127). As such, tolerance is accompanied by a certain degree of arrogance, which implicitly says: "We are right, you are wrong, we are superior, you are inferior, but you are not insufferable." There are various connotations to tolerance; religious, ethnic, nationalistic, ideological, racial, and biological. But in every case, the acceptance of the other is limited, regardless of whether we are "suffering" the presence of a different race or a different religion. Tolerance easily becomes intolerance once the tolerated group is believed to have broken the conditions it was supposed to live under. For this reason, "tolerance" cannot be the measure of ethics or human rights. "Unconditional hospitality" is the standard, so to speak, by which we measure our actions. However, as Derrida recognizes, "unconditional hospitality is practically impossible to live; one cannot in any case, and by definition, organize it" (PT 129). All political, legal, and religious forms of organization must, by necessity, be inhospitable to some. But, insofar as we are conscious of unconditional hospitality, we are acutely aware of the extent to which these forms are limited and exclusive. They are, to greater and lesser extents, unjust. Thus, Derrida says we must live in constant tension between the conditional forms of tolerance and practice found in politics, law and religion, and the unconditional imperative of absolute hospitality. This is Derrida's way of speaking about the metaxy: he encourages us to live in a perpetual state of critical reflection, of continual unease with our worldly systems of politics and law. The moment that we forget about the transcendent pole in this tension, the moment we try to relieve the tension and abolish the notion of unconditional hospitality, that is the moment when we will become enmeshed in what Derrida calls "theologico-political" forms; that is, in thoroughly immanent metanarratives that claim to be absolute but are, in fact, partial, exclusionary, and imperfectly hospitable. All thought, all law, and all politics are, for the deconstructionist, never complete; they are always provisional, and always in need of revision. Derrida speaks of unconditional hospitality as a "messianic promise" – a promise of, what he calls, a "democracy to come" in which absolute hospitality is granted to every "other." However, the "democracy to come" is not an actual event in the future, or, as Derrida puts it, it is not a "future present." [20] Derrida's "messianic" is structured by the general expectation of a "democracy to come" that is always expected but never arrives. No messiah, human or divine, will ever bring us "absolute hospitality." Nevertheless, Derrida advises us to adopt a paradoxical faith – a "quasi-messianism" [21] – that retains the messianic orientation while remaining acutely aware that the "democracy to come" will never actually come. This faith encourages "new effective forms of action, practice, organization, and so forth," because it reveals how far the present falls short promised messianic age. However, it prohibits us from accepting a vehement fundamentalism or a genocidal solution. [22]

#### Utilitarianism is unethical because it counts the self as equal to the other-responsibility must supercede the right to self-survival in order for ethics to be possible.

Emmanuel Levinas, Face to Face with Levinas, 1986, p. 23-24

**The approach to the face is the most basic mode of responsibility**. As such, the face of the other is verticality and uprightness; **it spells a relation of rectitude. The face is not in front of me** *(en face de moi)* **but above me**; it is the other before death, looking through and exposing death. Secondly, **the face is the other who asks me not to let him die alone, as if to do so were to become an accomplice in his death.** Thus the face says to me: you shall not kill. In the relation to the face I am exposed as a usurper of the place of the other. **The celebrated ‘right to existence’** that Spinoza called the *conatus essendi* and defined as the basic principle of all intelligibility **is challenged by the relation to the face.** Accordingly, **my duty to respond to the other suspends my natural right to self-survival**, *le droit aitale.* ***My* ethical relation of love for the other stems from the fact that the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the-world, within the ontology of sameness.** That is why I prefaced *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* with Pascal's phrase, "'*That is my place in the sun: That is how the usurpation of the whole world began."* Pascal makes the same point when he declares that *"the self is hateful."* Pascal's ethical sentiments here go against the ontological privileging of ‘the right to exist.’ **To expose myself to the vulnerability of the face is to put my ontological right to existence into question. In ethics, the other's right to exist has primacy over my own, a pri­macy epitomized in the ethical edict: you shall not kill**, you shall not jeopardize the life of the other. **The ethical rapport with the face is asymmetrical in that it subordinates my existence to the other.** This principle recurs in Darwinian biology as the "survival of the fittest" and in psychoanalysis as the natural instinct of the ‘id’ for gratifica­tion, possession, and power - the *libido dominandi*